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Abstract.  Standard  transaction cost  economics (TCE)  considers  transactions 
from the perspective of static efficiency. Increasingly, attention is  required to 
dynamic efficiency; to capabilities to exploit transaction relations for innovation. 
Since innovation is  dependent on knowledge and learning, the step from the 
statics to the dynamics of exchange requires an understanding of the development 
and acquisition of knowledge, preferences, and meaning, and the role in that of 
interaction between transaction partners. As a step towards this, the article pro- 
vides an exploration of theories of knowledge and knowledge development, the 
relation to language, the role of intersubjective relations, the connection with 
evolutionary theory and the implications for transaction cost theory. 
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Transaction  cost economics 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) was proposed originally by Coase (1937) to 
explain the existence of firms, and was further developed by Williamson (1975, 
1985). According to Williamson's prior work, the user of some productive input 
has a stark choice to make between two "governance structures": integration of 
production of the input in the "hierarchy" of his own firm, or purchase in "the 
market" from an outside producer. The advantage of outside purchase ("out- 
sourcing") lies in the "high powered incentives" of the market and in economy of 
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scale, by which the input is produced more cheaply by a  specialized producer 
supplying multiple users. There is a disadvantage due to transaction costs; partic- 
ularly costs of dependency on an outside partner,  which creates vulnerability of 
opportunism in so far as conditions are uncertain (during execution of the trans- 
action). To the extent that investments are more "transaction specific", there is 
less scope for economy of scale in outside production,  because the volume of 
production decreases to the volume needed by the focal user,  and  transaction 
costs of dependency increase. 1 At some point transaction costs exceed the benefits 
of outside production and in-house production is to be preferred (because under 
hierarchical control risks due to dependency are less).  For transactions with an 
"intermediate" degree of transaction specificity of assets, Williamson later (1985) 
made  allowance for two types of governance  structure  "between market  and 
hierarchy".  "Bilateral  governance",  with  the  institution  of different  kinds  of 
safeguards to limit transaction costs, in the case of frequent, recurring and sub- 
stantial transactions, which make the investment in such measures worth while. 
Examples of such safeguards are: ownership by the buyer of transaction specific 
productive assets; guarantees by the buyer, in the form of a guaranteed quantity 
and price of purchase or a severance payment; the supply of"hostages". Guaran- 
tees to the supplier require counter-safeguards to protect the buyer against mis- 
use. For more incidental or smaller transactions, which do not warrant the cost 
of such measures, "trilateral  governance" is proposed, with the appointment of 
a third party as an arbitrator to regulate any conflicts that may arise. 
TCE is  founded on two behavioral  assumptions:  bounded rationality  and 
opportunism.  It is due to the combination of these two conditions that  trans- 
action costs arise to the extent that  assets are "transaction  specific", whereby 
transaction partners become dependent on each other (are "locked in"). Bounded 
rationality is taken to arise from the scarcity or cost of information and limited 
capacity for information processing. If rationality were unbounded, all possible 
contingencies could be foreseen, even those arising from opportunism, and could 
be incorporated in a contract prior to commitment. If there were no opportunism, 
contracts  could  be left incomplete  in  the  trust  that  unforeseen  contingencies 
would be met in a spirit of cooperation and mutual benefit. In either case trans- 
action costs would be low. Since in fact bounded rationality and opportunism 
both occur there will be transaction costs. 
The limits of transaction cost economics 
In traditional TCE, the causes of the existence of firms are sought in consider- 
ations of efficiency. Given a certain  state of knowledge and technology and  a 
preference  ordering,  efficiency is  maximized  by trading  off production  costs, 
transaction costs and costs of organization.  The approach can be characterized 
as one of comparative statics, with a focus on static rather than dynamic efficien- 
cy. We define dynamic efficiency as efficiency in innovation, which is character- 
ized by shifts of knowledge, technology and preference. Shifts of knowledge imply 
shifts of preference,  since they may yield shifts  of perception  of outcomes of 
I  The relation between transaction specificity of products and productive assets is less close than 
standard TCE appears to assume, and this raises several complications. For a  discussion, see 
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opportunities or perception of new opportunities. Preferences may also shift due 
to a shift of evaluations of outcomes of opportunities or of corresponding risks. 
A shift of focus to dynamic efficiency would likely require substantial extensions 
or alterations  of theory.  This  was granted  by Williamson  (1985,  p. 143-144): 
"... the  study of economic organisation  in  a  regime of rapid  innovation  poses 
much more difficult issues than those addressed here" and "New hybrid forms of 
organisation may appear in response to such a condition ... Much more study of 
the relations between organisation  and innovation is needed". Since at present 
business is striving under such a "regime of rapid innovation", further insight is 
of some importance. 
In addition  to theoretical  considerations  there are empirical  arguments  for 
extending or revising TCE. The evidence is that increasingly, different forms of 
organization  develop "between market  and  hierarchy".  Although  in  the  later 
development of TCE such intermediate forms are accounted for to some extent in 
"bilateral and trilateral governance", not all the evidence can be assimilated. The 
empirical anomalies can be summarized as follows: there is outsourcing of pro- 
ductive inputs in spite of high (not just "intermediate") transaction specificity of 
related investments. Even then, there appears to be a lack of the safeguards against 
discontinuity that TCE prescribes. 
According to TCE ceteris paribus increasing uncertainty should lead to less 
outsourcing, since greater uncertainty yields more opportunities for opportunism 
to be exercized. In fact, we observe both increasing uncertainty, in both technol- 
ogy and market conditions, and an increase of outsourcing. Of course, the ceteris 
paribus  assumption  may  not  apply:  as  discussed  in  Nooteboom (1991b),  the 
development  of information  and  communication  technology  helps  to  reduce 
transaction costs, and thereby enhances the tendency towards outsourcing. 
In "industrial districts" or "flexible specialization", as discussed by Piore and 
Sabel (1983), there are configurations of partial cooperation and partial  rivalry 
between small firms with high apparent innovative success that are difficult to fit 
in in TCE. The evidence should be interpreted with care, as indicated by Amin 
(1989), but it nevertheless appears as an anomaly in TCE. 
When we turn to the evidence of individual cases of subcontracting, care is 
required. When one observes highly transaction specific products (specialties tai- 
lor-made for a specific user), these do not necessarily involve transaction specific 
investments. With highly flexible machinery (increasingly available from applica- 
tions  of information  technology) one can produce specific products with non- 
specific investments. 2 Nevertheless, there is evidence that does appear to contra- 
dict TCE. Semlinger (1991) reports that in the German automobile industry "in 
many cases, buying companies acquire possession of the moulds and dies neces- 
sary for the custom-made production  of the parts they order", as predicted by 
TCE, but that the supplier regards this as a threat to continuity rather than a help. 
Furthermore, instead of more guarantees of quantity and price of purchase there 
is a tendency towards increased flexibility, in spite of higher transaction specificity 
of investments. 
We propose that the theoretical and empirical problems for TCE are connect- 
ed: the empirical  anomalies  arise  from a  shift  of focus from  static to dynamic 
efficiency,  while the latter is not included in standard TCE. 
2  For a  further analysis of specificity in TCE,  see Nooteboom (1990a). 284  B. Nooteboom 
The strategic need of outsourcing 
The competitive environment of firms is turbulent. Technological development is 
fast, yielding, among other things, a faster obsolescence of products and produc- 
tion technology, and more opportunities for differentiated products at low prices. 
Consumer preferences are becoming at the same time more differentiated (within 
countries) and more similar (across  countries). Many markets have developed 
from sellers'  to  buyers' markets, increasing pressure  on  price  and  stimulating 
product differentiation to escape from that pressure. This is consonant with the 
greater differentiation of demand, combined with greater similarity of demand 
across countries, allowing for the achievement of economy of scale in spite of 
product differentiation, by an orientation towards global markets. With the emer- 
gence of Japan and the other "tigers", there are more players in the competitive 
arena. As a result, life cycles of products become both shorter and more synchro- 
nized between countries. This necessitates product innovation which is fast, early 
and wide. Fast, i.e. with the shortest possible time between start and introduction 
to market. Early, i.e. before the previous generation of the product has outlived 
itself, or even before it has been introduced to the market. Wide, i.e. in different 
countries simultaneously, or globally. Firms must simultaneously offer low price, 
high quality, high flexibility and high innovativeness. Firms in many industries are 
facing a shake-out which they will survive only if they are expert in the innovation 
of products and production. To achieve such competence, firms must concentrate 
on main areas of excellence, thereby outsourcing inputs as much as strategically 
possible, in spite of high transaction specificity of related assets. 3 Considerations 
of dynamic efficiency and strategic scope take precedence over considerations of 
static efficiency.  4 
This gives part of the explanation we are looking for, but we want to yield a 
more complete and more analytical explanation. So far we have hinted only at an 
explanation why buyers may accept transactions in spite of highly specific assets. 
But why are suppliers willing to accept them? Why do we observe fewer safe- 
guards than predicted by TCE? While the solutions provided by TCE may not 
remain, at least not without important alterations, the problems raised by TCE 
do remain: in case of highly transaction specific investments, how does one cope 
with the resulting risks of discontinuity due to bounded rationality and oppor- 
tunism under conditions of uncertainty? Whatever theory is  used to  supplant 
TCE, it should answer this question. 
The dimension of time 
For a proper understanding of subcontracting relations, we need to consider not 
incidental transactions, but transactions in the setting of an exchange relation that 
develops in time. Williamson himself  tends to slide into a discussion of transaction 
3 For a complementary view on the strategic import of outsourcing, see Semlinger (1991 a, b). 
4 Note that there are limits to the strategic desirability of outsourcing: one may want to maintain 
an in-house capability for a technology in order not to become dependent on suppliers who are 
also competitors; because it is complementary with respect to a core technology (economy of 
scope); because the technology may be the carrier of a new generation of  products that one needs 
to maintain access to. Towards a dynamic  theory of transactions  285 
relations rather than transactions, but even in his later work (1985) backs out of 
the implications. An embedding of a  transaction in an ongoing process of ex- 
change is required to make TCE coherent. Without that, one cannot meaningfully 
employ the customary parlance of setting up an agreement "ex ante" and coping 
with problems  of control "ex post", with all the complications of monitoring, 
"haggling", renegotiation, handling hostages, arbitration, etc.  The problem  of 
bounded rationality that TCE purports to deal with is that one cannot foresee all 
contingencies that may occur during execution of an agreement to transact. In 
other words: new facts or conditions may be perceived in time. But if that is 
allowed, one must also  allow for shifts of the perception  and  expectation of 
opportunism, and for shifts of preference or goals. The claim of TCE is not that 
opportunism is practised by everyone all of the time, but by some people some of 
the time, but since ex ante one does not know when and by whom, governance of 
contracts should be designed to take opportunism into account. But then, as a 
transaction relation develops in time, perceived risk of opportunism is bound to 
develop as well. 5 What is more, the issue of transaction specificity  of assets ac- 
quires substance only with the possibility of repeated transactions in the future. 
If such a perspective is lacking, and it is known beforehand that an investment is 
fully specific to a single, isolated transaction, the problem is trivial: the investment 
will be made only if it is recouped in the price to be agreed for the transaction here 
and now. Non-triviality of the problem of transaction specific assets demands the 
perspective of possible but uncertain ongoing transactions in the future. 
Dynamic analysis 
The purpose of the present paper is to offer an exploration in dynamic analysis, 
aimed at developing TCE into a more general transaction cost theory (TCT). The 
exploration is used to support, among other things, the development of hypothe- 
ses for empirical research of subcontracting relations.  6 
In a dynamic analysis we can no longer take knowledge/technology  and pre- 
ferences as given, and we have to deal with "radical" uncertainty. We make the 
usual distinction (following Frank Knight) between risk, in which the probabilities 
are known of given outcomes of given options, and "fundamental" or "radical" 
uncertainty, in which one does not know all outcomes of a given option, or does 
not know all the options, or may shift one's goals. The concept of knowledge 
includes perception and interpretation (which includes understanding or explana- 
tion).  Preference is  associated with evaluation. Learning can be construed as 
change of knowledge and/or preferences; i.e. change of perception, interpretation 
or evaluation. This goes together with change of meaning. Change of knowledge 
can arise on two levels: new outcomes of a given option and new options for the 
realization of a given goal. Change of preference may involve new goals, which 
open up the possibility of new options and may alter the value of outcomes of 
given options. Here, the issue  of radical uncertainty has been made part of the 
issue of learning. 
The problem with dynamic analysis, thus defined, is that it places us outside 
of traditional economic analysis, where preferences are assumed to be stable, and 
5 Note that it does not necessarily  decrease; it may increase in an escalation of suspicion. 
6 Cf. Berger, Noorderhaven, Nooteboom  & Pennink (1991). The research is conducted with a 
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lack of knowledge is seen merely as limited possession of a good called informa- 
tion, which can be acquired at a cost. Thus, we must look outside of established 
(neo-classical) economic theory. 
A  likely candidate  is evolutionary theory, for which we might  employ the 
pioneering work of Nelson &Winter (1982), and later work by Mokyr (1990) and 
de Bresson (1987). From an evolutionary perspective, development of some form 
of life (species) is the result of sources of variation (in biology e.g. random muta- 
tions) in the composition and transmission of characteristics from a pool (geno- 
type) into their embodiment in individuals (phenotpye), a selection environment 
operating on the individuals, and the transmission of surviving characteristics to 
subsequent generations. Of course, evolution in a social context is not identical to 
biological evolution, but evolution is more than a mere metaphor for socio-eco- 
nomic development. It purports to represent a "logic of change" which applies to 
different kinds of development. 
In  a  social context, mutations  are  not  random,  since  they are  directed by 
thought, design, planning,  cooperation. They are still  stochastic, however, since 
planning is disturbed by the unforeseen, and novelty often is the fruit of chance 
(serendipity). Entrepreneurship  might be seen as the source of variation in eco- 
nomics,  yielding novel technology/product/market  combinations (TPM's),  and 
the market (plus institutional  conditions and  politics) as the selection environ- 
ment. However, in contrast with biological evolution, in socio-economic evolu- 
tion the selection evironment can be affected by individuals of the evolving species, 
by the influence of firms or coalitions among them on market structure (concen- 
tration, entry barriers, economies of scale and scope) and on institutions. Educa- 
tion, learning, training of successors to the management of successful businesses, 
growth of the firm, the formation  of subsidiaries, licensing,  takeovers, and  the 
shaping of market structure and institutions can be seen as mechanisms of trans- 
mission. Contrary to biological evolution, in socio-economic evolution transmis- 
sion of acquired characteristics (Lamarckianism) is possible. While in biological 
evolution genetic transmission maintains characteristics integrally, in socio-eco- 
nomic transmission there is dilution and drift of characteristics. Furthermore, in 
contrast with biology, in social evolution we have the possibility of cross-species 
transfer of characteristics. 8 
While Nelson & Winter (1982) took firms to constitute a species, later scholars 
(de Bresson, 1987, Mokyr, 1990) took techniques: it is the survival of techniques 
not firms that captures the crux of economic evolution. It seems that we should 
allow for selection on the level of both species and individuals within a species.  9 
A recursive application of this would yield a hierarchy of selection processes and 
levels of evolution, which can influence each other: of ideas in people and firms; 
of TPM's and firms in markets; of industries and institutions in society; of societies 
in global development. We would thus have a multi-level theory to account for 
v There is "genetic drift" in biological evolution as well, as a  result of "copying errors", but 
apart from such errors genes maintain their integrity (in Mendelian processes of combination), 
whereas in cultural transmission shifts of meaning due to difference of interpretation and under- 
standing are inherent rather than incidental. 
8  In biology, cross-species mating is impossible (or in any case does not produce  offspring), 
while in social evolution there is "off-spring" without mating, and cultural "parenthood" goes 
far beyond biological parenthood. 
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social evolution. In the remainder of this article attempts are made to offer ele- 
ments  of such a  theory: cognitive development in individuals,  development of 
meaning in discourse, and of new TPM's in markets. 
To fully develop evolutionary theory for socio-economic systems, we need a 
theory of knowledge (epistemology), and in particular  of the development and 
acquisition  of knowledge (genetic epistemology), which takes us into  develop- 
mental psychology. Change of perception, interpretation  and evaluation implies 
change of meaning,  which takes us into theory of language.  Particularly in the 
context of transactions we need to include in our exploration the role of relations 
between subjects in the formation of knowledge, preferences, and meaning. This 
inevitably takes us into sociology. As a result, our present exploration might be 
called  philosophical  in  the  sense that  it is pre-scientific:  in  terms  of Kuhnian 
methodology, it  tries  to  contribute  to  the  development  of a  new dynamic  or 
evolutionary paradigm rather than conducting "normal science" within the estab- 
lished paradigm of established economics. The area to be explored is so wide that 
it would be impossible, and counterproductive, to give a  resume of all  theories 
from philosophy, psychology, linguistics  and sociology that might  be germane. 
The focus will  be on a few philosophers that  are particularly  relevant and also 
relatively unknown to economists: Jean Piaget, Michael Polanyi and Ferdinand 
de Saussure.  The  working hypothesis is  that  by taking  up their views we will 
contribute to new theory. 
Our focus is on issues of knowledge (learning) and preference (preference for- 
mation)  in  transaction  cost  theory, which  have  implications  for  TCE  via the 
behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism. We concen- 
trate on the question how subjects change their knowledge and preferences, and 
how this is related to interaction  between them. Since the focus is on inter-firm 
relations, the analysis is situated on the micro level of individual firms, rather than 
on the micro-micro level of individuals within firms. This requires that in the use 
of psychology and sociology the necessary inferences have to made from individ- 
ual people to groups of people. For example, when we talk of a perceiving "sub- 
ject" it is a firm,  and a  question is how perceptions of individuals make up the 
perception of a firm. This yields important and interesting issues of organization 
which in the present paper we can only treat  very restrictively.  Ultimately the 
connection should be made in a multi-level theory hinted at before. 
Bounds of rationality 
The boundedness of rationality goes beyond the cost or scarcity of information 
and limitations in the capacity for its processing. A well known problem, within 
mainstream theory, lies in Arrow's paradox of information: If one does not have 
information, one is not likely to know its marginal utility, and marginal cost may 
be unknown as well, so that one cannot balance the two in the maximization of 
utility. The transaction specificity of information is also likely to be unknown be- 
forehand. If one does have all that knowledge, one is likely to already have the 
information and no longer needs to invest in its acquisition. To acquire informa- 
tion rationally, in the traditional economic sense of balancing marginal cost and 
marginal  utility, one must rely on "evaluative" prior information (info2) on the 
marginal  cost  and  revenue  and  the  transaction  specificity of the  information 
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ond order issues of transaction costs of that prior information (info 2). What risks 
of opportunism are there in the acquisition of the evaluative information (info 2)? 
Since investment in human  resource assets is  often investment in information, 
knowledge or skill, rational decision-making concerning such investment is prob- 
lematic in principle. Williamson (1985) was certainly aware of this problem. This 
arises for example in a discussion of the position of a worker who has to decide 
whether to participate in training which may be so specific to the present firm that 
it ties him further to it. To find out how firm specific the course is, it would for a 
lesser risk of opportunism be better, in principle, to ask the union than to ask the 
firm's personnel department. But the relevant problems of knowledge go much 
deeper. For a dynamic theory we require a  theory of acquisition and change of 
knowledge (genetic epistemology), for which useful ideas can be obtained from the 
work of Jean Piaget 1  o and of Michael Polanyi.11 
Categories of understanding 
Implicitly, neoclassical theory and TCE assume that while information may be 
costly to obtain, and capacity to process it may be costly or limited, they are in 
principle available to all in a given form, containing or generating objective truth. 
It is a  matter of cost only; not a matter of competence or time required for ab- 
sorbing information. The underlying empiricist epistemology, however, is defunct 
and really has been since the philosopher Kant. In terms of Kantian "critical" 
philosophy: mainstream economics is uncritical of perception and knowledge.12 
Perception and thought are conditioned by categories of understanding, in the 
double sense of being made possible and being limited by them. Apart from giving 
form or coherence to otherwise senseless sense impressions, categories perform the 
heuristic function of shutting out impressions that do not fit the present purpose. 
To be receptive to and explicitly aware of all available bits of information all the 
time, regardless of context or purpose, would eliminate all purpose, if it were pos- 
sible. The problem increasingly is not how we can obtain all available informa- 
tion, but how we can ignore irrelevant information. Or in the terms of Polanyi, at 
any moment we have "focal" awareness  only of some  pockets of information, 
while the rest of available information lies in "subsidiary" awareness. Much infor- 
mation and knowledge is "tacit": we are hardly aware that we have it. Sometimes 
the influx of information or its triggering of action is obstructed consciously, for 
strategic reasons, to achieve a "pre-commitment" to certain actions. An example 
is the famous case of Ulyssess, who had his crew block their ears and himself tied 
to the mast of his ship, in order for him to listen to the sirens without the possi- 
10  The term "genetic epistemology" is derived from the work of Jean Piaget. For the work of 
Piaget and criticism see Flavell (1967), Piaget (1970, 1973), Mischel (1971). There is no space to 
go deeply into this literature. Let me only state that I am aware of the criticism of Piaget's work, 
and that to a limited extent I concur with it, but that I still think that some of Piaget's ideas can 
legitimately and usefully be employed, as a general "logic of change", or the beginning thereof. 
11  Cf. Polanyi (1962, 1966, 1969). 
~2  Similar criticism of the epistemological foundations of neoclassical economics and TCE was 
given earlier by Etzioni (1988), Hodgson (1988), Groenewegen (1989), among others. The epis- 
temology used here is derived from Kant, Bachelard, Piaget, Cassirer, Polanyi, Merlean-Ponty, 
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bility of being enticed to disaster, as discussed by Elster (1979). See also ploys of 
pre-commitment in bargaining, as discussed by Schelling (1960). In the course of 
evolution, deliberate blocking may become tacit or automatic (instinctive),  if it has 
survival value. 
Tacit knowledge is typically acquired in learning by doing rather than by ab- 
stract learning, but abstract learning also tends to sink into tacitness. As pointed 
out by Simon (1983), the role of emotions in rationality is to call attention to some 
issue of choice and action; to bring some subset of choice into the focus of aware- 
ness and rational evaluation. What one considers relevant and what one considers 
noise depends on one's purpose, outlook and experience, and on the emotional 
agenda.  Different judgements on purpose and relevance make decision making 
political. The job of politics is to "add apples and pears"; to reconcile different or 
incommensurable views of the world. Within organisations, apart from a possible 
divergence  between private  and  firm  interest,  which is  the focus of economic 
theories of organisation,  different functions or guardians  of different resources 
may perceive the  interest  of the firm  differently (cf. the  "resource dependence 
theory" of Pfeffer & Salancik,  1978). To be effective,  organisations also have to 
define the relevant in order to shut out noise, and this requires some coordination 
of the perceptions and perspectives of individuals within the firm. This function is 
performed by administrative and social routines, supported by cultural program- 
ming (including the use of symbols and rituals).  In the wider context of society this 
role is performed by norms and values, which are also inculcated by social pro- 
gramming.  Wholly or partly, the purpose of routines, norms, values and culture 
is to streamline decision making by a reduction of political haggling; by means of 
a greater commonality of  judgements on purpose and relevance. This can develop 
(or break down) within but also between firms. 
The present theme was taken up and given more clarity and rigour by Heiner 
(1983). When our cognitive capacity is inadequate to cope with uncertainty and 
complexity, to the point that we cannot reliably select appropriate actions in some 
contingencies, behaviour will be constrained by rules that neglect the correspond- 
ing options and contingencies, because they cannot reliably be dealt with suffi- 
ciently to make the effort worth while. (Radical) uncertainty will make behaviour 
less erratic, not more. Widening the boundaries of rationality will make behavior 
more complex and  difficult to predict, since it allows for a  wider repertoire  of 
actions fitted to contingencies. 
In the epistemologies of Piaget and Polanyi, the idea is developed that cate- 
gories of thought are acquired and developed in interaction with one's physical, 
social  and  cultural  environment.  Intelligence  is  internalized  practice  (Piaget). 
Once acquired, categories may sink to a level of "tacitness" (Polanyi), where they 
may become permanently  subsidiary,  then  second nature  and  finally  a  reflex. 
There they tend to harden into "epistemological obstacles" (Bachelard), blocking 
the consideration or even perception of novel phenomena that do not fit.13 
The tacitness of knowledge has important implications for transaction costs. 
The implications  are particularly  relevant  to  small  business, where knowledge 
tends to be more tacit. In large firms knowledge tends to be more explicit and 
~a  Gaston Bachelard (1974, 1975, 1980; reprints of work published originally around 1940) 
anticipated much of the work of Kuhn (1970). For a review of Bachelard's "histological episte- 
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formal, since it has to be shared by more people, who do not interact directly, 
informally and orally. 14 
First, for an outside monitor of some agent it is hard to assess performance if 
it is based on tacit knowledge of which even the performing agent himself is not 
aware. Second, if one is unaware of the (tacit) knowledge upon which one acts, that 
knowledge is hard to transfer to someone else, particularly by explanation and 
specification of rules. If at all, it can be transferred only by ostension (showing how 
one does it),  or after tacit knowledge has been made more explicit (as a  result, 
building expert systems may not be as easy as some people seem to think). Transfer 
is more easily performed by the transfer of the person (or the firm) in which the 
knowledge is embodied. The difficulty of copying tacit knowledge has the advan- 
tage of making innovative rewards from it more easily appropriable. 15 Third, it 
is difficult to be critical of one's own knowledge, or skill if they are tacit. As taught 
by Rogers (1983), the first stage in the adoption of a new product is awareness of 
a need and of the availability of a means to satisfy it. With tacit knowledge this 
is problematic. The marketing of a  new product may require an explicitation of 
tacit knowledge before a  potential customer can attain awareness. 16 
Some of these issues were recognized but not carried through by Williamson, 
which  is  remarkable in view of the  fact that he is  one  of the  rare mainstream 
economists to recognise the relevance of Polanyi's work. 
The dynamics of categories 
According  to  Piaget  the  acquisition  or  development  of novel categories  arises 
from successive stages of "assimilating" experience in present categories, which 
provide both the basis and the incentive for "accommodation" towards a  novel 
category, as a transformation and novel synthesis of preceding categories. 17 The 
successive stages of assimilation are: 
￿9  "recognition and repetition": recognition that observations of an as yet ill de- 
fined class can be subsumed under a novel category, whereby the latter becomes 
more determinate. 
￿9  "generalisation": explorations of the boundaries of a category: how far can it be 
taken to apply? 
￿9  "differentiation":  how  do  different  applications  of the  category  differ;  what 
modifications are required in different contexts; what patterns in this differenti- 
ation may be identified? 
14  For a further discussion of effects of scale in transaction  costs, see Nooteboom (1990c). 
15  This is important especially for small firms, where knowledge tends to be more tacit, and 
for whom the costs of filing for a patent are relatively high due to the threshold  of a minimum 
cost. 
16  For the implications for the marketing of business services to small firms, see Nooteboom, 
Zwart & Bijmolt (1992). For the implications for government supported transfer of technology 
to small firms, see Nooteboom, Coehoorn & v.d. Zwaan (1990). 
17  The merit of Piaget's work, as I see it, is that to some extent (though not completely) it fills 
the gap that Kuhn (1970) left between "normal science" and "revolution". In Kuhn's view 
"puzzles" were part of normal science, while the accumulation  of "anomalies" leads to revolu- 
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￿9  "reciprocation," as a  prelude  to accommodation:  where do applications  im- 
pinge  on  other  categories,  and  how  do  these  differing  categories  interact. 
Novelty often arises from novel combinations of categories which before where 
perceived as unrelated. 
Parts of knowledge develop in interaction with other parts of knowledge. Piaget's 
theory clarifies the rationality of a  certain  amount  of cognitive and  theoretical 
conservatism, which was proposed, notably, by Kuhn (1970). It is not only un- 
reasonable and uneconomic but cognitively infeasible to satisfy the demand that 
a  practice or theory be rejected as soon as any misfit in its application  occurs 
(as suggested by Popper's methodology of falsificationism).  First, how can one 
know that  it "really" is a  misfit if the boundaries of validity are not yet clear; 
when  one  does not  yet know  whether  or  not  it  can  fruitfully  be adjusted  to 
assimilate the apparent misfit? Second, how can one know in what direction to 
look for a replacement if one has not explored boundaries of validity; differences 
in application; interfaces and connections with other concepts, practices or theo- 
ries? Novelty does not spring forth fully equipped like Athena from the brow of 
Zeus. 
Implications for opportunities and  costs of transactions  arise from the fact 
that the transfer of technology, skill or knowledge that may be required to enable 
production  of a  product  is  problematic  to  the  extent  that  the  developmental 
sequence of stages has to be "lived through" for effective adoption. This need not 
always be the case, and care must be taken not to absolutize the Piagetian se- 
quence: much can be transferred  by teaching,  training,  purchase  of technology 
embodied in machinery, hiring experts or taking over a specialized firm. But not 
everything and not always: often, the effectiveness of technology depends on the 
context and the experience of an organisation, and the pattern of activities that 
determines  its  "scope".  In  Piagetian  terms  an  important  question  is:  can  the 
technology  be  assimilated  in  present  categories,  or  is  an  accommodation  re- 
quired? A first implication  for TCE is that  such obstacles in the acquisition  of 
technology, or more generally the resources required for production, can decide 
the issue whether to make or to buy, perhaps  very much regardless of risks of 
opportunism or specificity of assets. 
Williamson proposed, incorrectly in the view of the present author, that tech- 
nologically inseparable effects of scope are not very significant;  that  to the ex- 
tent  that  they occur they do so only up to a  modest scale (the largest  scale of 
inseparable scope effects that Williamson could envisage was that of an orchestra; 
cf. Williamson, 1985, p. 88, footnote 4). A second implication of the above is that 
the dependence of learning on context and experience considerably increases the 
importance of effects of "scope": more activities will have to go together because 
they are  technologically  or cognitively inseparable  than  assumed  in  standard 
TCE. This is related to the issue of "path-dependency" that arises also in evolu- 
tionary economics: if practice in a given context shapes the capacity for learning 
a new practice, path-dependency appears, whereby it is difficult or impossible to 
shift from one trajectory of development to another.IS 
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Cross-firm economy of learning 
When we turn to the perspective of dynamic efficiency,  the above analysis indi- 
cates the need of partnerships with other firms, particularly firms that are similar 
(though not identical) or complementary to one's own production. These partner- 
ships serve to overcome obstacles to learning due to tacitness of knowledge, delays 
in the process of learning, effects of scope and context, and path dependency in 
learning, and to contribute to the process of assimilation (particularly reciproca- 
tion) and accommodation. One needs others to perceive, interpret and do what 
one could not do one-self for lack of the proper perspective, understanding and 
experience. In a static context of stable technology, stable consumer preferences 
and stable arena's of competition the problems do not arise, but under present 
conditions of turbulence they do. 
In other words: inter-firm relations solve a paradox faced by firms in a turbu- 
lent environment. On the one hand, in order to survive firms must focus on their 
specific area of competence, and this limits the width of perception, interpretation 
and evaluation. On the other hand, they must remain receptive to changes in the 
environment that might create new opportunities or threats. To resolve this, firms 
focus on "core activities" while using relations with suppliers, customers, competi- 
tors (in  temporary and local or partial  "strategic alliances") and  others as sig- 
nalling devices and as triggers or sources of new competences when the need for 
them arises. The underlying assumption is that in view of links of complementar- 
ity (suppliers, customers) or similarity (competitors) their idiosyncracies in knowl- 
edge and preferences (perceptions, interpretations and evaluations) are likely to be 
relevant. In subcontracting relations, this may well be as important for the pro- 
ducer as for the user. Note that this could explain outsourcing in spite of highly 
transaction  specific investment,  for  the  reason  that  one  simply would not  be 
capable  to  produce  the  input  in-house  at  an  acceptable level  of quality  and 
dynamic efficiency. 
In Nooteboom (1991 a) the notion set out here is formalized, and it is claimed 
to yield a type of "economy" on a  par with the established economies of scale, 
scope and experience, in what may be called "cross-firm economy of learning". 
While economies of scale, scope and experience can only be achieved by a combi- 
nation of different activities in one context (firm), this economy of learning can 
only be achieved in linkages between different contexts (firms), i.e. firms which are 
sufficiently independent to have their own categories of perception and interpre- 
tation, associated with different paths of experience. 
The analysis gives an epistemological underpinning  of the "strength of weak 
ties" in "loosely coupled systems" noted before by Granovetter (1982). If autono- 
my of a part of a system is defined as the probability that it can survive separation 
for  the  system ~9,  what  we are  saying  is  that  for  cognitive  reasons  increased 
turbulence yields a  reduction  of autonomy: severance of interfirm  connections 
reduces probability of survival. In the perspective offered by Heiner (1983): on the 
level  of individual  firms  the  scope and  flexibility of perception  and  action  is 
reduced because of insufficient reliability of coping with a wider set of options and 
contingencies,  but  by  inter-firm  links  between  such  more  constrained  units, 
greater flexibility and scope is achieved on the higher system level of firms with 
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links between them. Note that the effect of cross-firm learning requires difference 
of perception  and  interpretation,  but also a  certain  commonality of concepts, 
practices, procedures and perhaps organizational structure, sufficient to establish 
and maintain an effective linkage: a common "language" has to be developed. To 
the extent that this is specific to the transaction relation, as it is likely to be at least 
to some extent, this represents another and possibly major transaction  specific 
investment. Since the investment takes time to develop, in ongoing experience of 
interaction,  and has a  certain minimum  size, depending on the complexity and 
specificity of the linkage, the transaction relation is required to last some time to 
make the investment effective and worth while, which contributes to an explana- 
tion of why such relations are often lasting to some extent. This claim will later 
be supported by means of the linguistic philosophy of Ferdinand  de Saussure, 
which claims that meanings of terms follow from communicative interaction  as 
much as they precede it. 
Furthermore, the analysis helps to understand why not only the buyer but also 
the supplier is willing to enter upon transaction specific investments, even in spite 
of absence of guarantees as prescribed by TCE. In standard TCE a symmetry of 
dependence between buyer and supplier is suggested too easily. The dependence 
of the supplier is evident, in the paradigm case of transaction specific investments 
in production. The buyer is assumed to become dependent as well because in case 
of discontinuity of supply no other supplier will be able to supply a product of 
equal quality or price immediately. Thus the price of discontinuity to the buyer 
is higher price of the product, lower quality or delay. This is no doubt plausible, 
but the price and risk involved in many cases seem to be substantially less than 
for the supplier, who stands to lose major investments.  Here, in the context of 
cross-firm learning, the buyer also will often have to make a transaction specific 
investment, which may contribute to more symmetry in the lock-in between buyer 
and supplier. Here, it might even be wise for the supplier not to have the buyer 
own the transaction specific assets of production, contrary to standard TCE, in 
order to better maintain the buyer's dependence on him. This might explain one 
of the anomalies in TCE theory discussed by Semlinger (1991 a, b): suppliers who 
would rather  not have the buyer own the transaction  specific investments for 
production.  A  similar  explanation,  though  not  based  on  the  epistemology of 
Polanyi and Piaget, was offered by Semlinger. 
Opportunism and learning 
It is not actual but expected opportunism that drives TCE, and expected oppor- 
tunism derives from experience and perception. Allowing for an ongoing trans- 
action relation,  which is where problems of discontinuity are relevant, and for 
change of knowledge (perception and interpretation), we must allow for a change 
of perceived risk of opportunism as the transaction relation proceeds. Of course, 
perceived risk need not necessarily decrease: a minor breach of expectation or trust, 
or even a misunderstanding, may yield an increase of mistrust, yielding measures 
to contain perceived risks, which trigger further mistrust, yielding an escalation of 
perceived opportunism. But when on the whole the relation is fruitful, perceived 
risk of opportunism is likely to decline. Furthermore, if we allow preferences also 
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purpose, whether for reasons of loyalty, sympathy, economy of attention or sim- 
ply out of inertia. In other words: in learning mutual trust may grow. 
This brings us to the sociological literature  on relations between firms.  For 
example, according to Ouchi (1980), in a process of socialization in "clans", differ- 
ent actors may develop or exchange implicit rules, norms or values that govern 
their interaction. More on a macro level, North (1990) adduces transaction costs 
as a reason for the development of institutional arrangements, including sets of 
culturally determined norms, to contain transaction costs that would otherwise be 
too high to allow for the degree of specialization on which prosperity depends. 
Heiner (1983) explains institutions as a means of reducing complexity to compen- 
sate for lack of reliability in taking appropriate action. 
Here, let us limit the discussion to the development of trust on the micro level 
of bilateral interaction. 2~ According to Berger & Luckmann (1966) any human 
activity that is repeated frequently is subject to habitualization,  which frees the 
individual from the making of many decisions and thus provides a "psychological 
relief'. This economy of attention is consistent with Simon's notion of restricted 
capacity for information processing, and with Polanyi's notion of tacit knowledge. 
In the following we provide a further theoretical basis for such views. 
Knowledge and preferences are acquired and developed in interaction with the 
physical but also the social and cultural environment. This idea emerges in parts 
of sociology: in "symbolic interactionism" (G. H. Mead), with its interpretive view 
of sociality as  constituted  by meaning,  or more  aptly in  "ethnomethodology" 
(Garfinkel), with its focus on the local, intersubjective production of meaning and 
social order (cf. Cuff, Sharrock & Francis, 1979 for a survey). If, appropriately in 
my view, social life is seen as constituted by meaning, and hence sociology as an 
interpretive discipline, so that language is central, let us consider the philosophy 
of language. A second reason for considering how meanings arise lies in our earlier 
thesis that in the development of cross-firm learning a type of language, or some 
other appropriate basis for exchange, must be developed, and that this takes time. 
A third reason for turning to a theory of language is that in the development of 
evolutionary theory it might provide a model for the process of entrepreneurial 
innovation as a source of variation in the selection environment of markets and 
institutions.  The analogy is that  in language speakers produce novel meanings 
(source of variation)  in the context of a  speech community (selection environ- 
ment), and this produces the evolution of language. 
Language and innovation 
In contemporary philosophy, the traditional consciousness theory of knowledge 
is replaced by theories of knowledge and meaning which take communication and 
interaction  between subjects as the origin. 21 The French linguistic philosopher 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1979; reprint of lectures given between 1906 and 1911), in 
particular, is relevant to our present purpose. Before de Saussure, one tended to 
20  A broader discussion  of trust is given in Berger, Noorderhaven, Nooteboom and Pennink 
(1991). 
21  Here we draw from Freud, Marx,  Nietzsche,  and subsequently the French philosophers 
de Saussure and Merleau-Ponty, the "postmodernists" Levinas, Lacan, L6vi-Strauss, Foucault, 
Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard,  and the Aglo-Saxon philosophers  Quine and Rorty. Towards a dynamic theory of transactions  295 
see meaning as something that is given; established prior to communication, as a 
presence in the head, as it were, which is expressed in words as fixed vehicles of 
given meanings. The importance of de Saussure is that he creates a reversal: the 
meaning of a  signifier ("signifiant", in French) results from a  collision between 
signifiers in the field of communication. Meaning is not something that is trans- 
ferred as a previously existing identity, but something that arises and changes in 
the use of words and from that process forms thought. "A word means what other 
words do not mean". Meaning is not constituted by some form of identity of a 
signifier to some pre-established concept that it signifies, but by differences in use 
between different signifiers, which build concepts. The link between a signifier and 
the concept that it signifies ("signifi6") is arbitrary in the sense that it is not based 
on any inherent, objective link of form or substance. A  horse could be, and  in 
different languages  indeed is,  named  by any  other name.  It  is  because of this 
arbitrariness of meaning that meaning is and can be inherently social (i.e. intersub- 
jective) rather than personal, and is subject to change. 22 Meaning has no basis in 
essence and is purely conventional, and  therefore we can agree to the shifts of 
meaning that are required for innovation. This is the marvel of language: its order 
is not rigorous or strict but yet it is an order. 23 De Saussure explained language 
("langage")  as  consisting  of  a  social  order  ("langue")  and  individual  usage 
("parole"). Langue provides an existing ("synchronic") intersubjective order based 
on conventionally acceptable relations and combinations of linguistic elements. 
Parole is a source of ("diaehronic") change; deviant individual usage may catch on 
to be accepted as the conventional norm. For this to be possible, the rules from 
langue are general but not imperative: there is a certain tolerance for heterodox 
language use. The "logic" of language is not strict: there are no necessary and suffi- 
cient conditions for correct usage of a linguistic term. Rather, there are degrees of 
acceptability and heterodoxy. The importance of this lies in the fact that without 
heterodoxy there can be no innovation. But the implication also is that in commu- 
nication understanding is never perfect in the sense of identity of meaning between 
speakers. 
The implication  for TCE is  that  innovation appears  to  require interaction 
between individuals  within  a  firm  or between individual  firms,  with  a  proper 
mixture of idiosyncracy ("parole") and intersubjectivity ("langue").  24 To change 
one's ideas one needs to interact with others, or, more strongly, one develops or 
indeed obtains one's identity by interaction. 25 This links up with the notion from 
22  There are important links between de Saussure and Wittgenstein, in the impossibility of a 
private language, "meaning as use" and the working of language as games people play. 
23  Elsewhere, in Nooteboom (1985, 1990b), I propose that there is a workable methodological 
order, between the unworkable order of Popper's "logic" and the unacceptable methodological 
anarchism of Feyerabend, in the general philosophy of science, and of McCloskey and Klamer 
in economics, and that intermediate order is to be modelled after the non-strict order of  language 
(associated with the notion of "plausibility"). 
24  For an application of Piaget and de Saussure to issues of the organisation of innovation, see 
Nooteboom (1989). 
25  The ideas set out here are similar, up to a point, to the "theory of communicative action" 
from Habermas (1982, 1984), who also employed the genetic epistemology of Piaget. A differ- 
ence between Habermas and the present article (and postmodern thinking) is that for Habermas 
the focus and purpose was intersubjective consensus (Saussurian "langue"), while here the focus 
is on the disturbance of consensus by innovation (Saussurian "parole"), with little expectation 
of  any "ultimate" consensus. For a further discussion of the implications of  postmodern philoso- 
phy for the theory of markets, see Nooteboom (1992). 296  B. Nooteboom 
Piaget that in the process of developing knowledge, accommodation follows from 
reciprocation  in assimilation.  The  present predicament  of firms in  a  turbulent 
environment can now be formulated as follows: to focus on one's specific com- 
petence, one needs to tighten intersubjectivity (langue) within the firm, limiting 
idiosyncracy (parole). But to maintain  sources of innovation,  one must then be 
receptive to parole from outside; from outside partners. However, as a carrier of 
this, in communication between transaction  partners,  one needs to develop the 
intersubjectivity of langue, which requires a certain continuity of interaction. Per- 
haps  Saussure's concept of language  can  serve more in general  as a  model of 
innovation. From an evolutionary perspective, in language the source of variation 
is  idiosyncratic,  individual  usage  ("parole"),  the  selection  environment  is  the 
speech community that jointly determines accepted practice ("langue"), and trans- 
mission  occurs  by  dictionaries,  lexicons,  encyclopedia's,  textbooks,  schools. 
Understanding of the evolution of meaning may contribute to our understanding 
of evolution in socio-economic systems. Before, we noted that in economics the 
source of variation is the entrepreneur (who often is an independent, but may also 
step forward in the context of a large firm), the selection mechanism is markets and 
institutions  (in  a  wide  sense, including  politics  and  social/cultural  norms  and 
values), and  transmission  occurs by education, growth of successful firms,  sub- 
sidiaries, licensing,  takeovers, and the shaping  of market structure  and  institu- 
tions.  Entrepreneurship  as the source of variation  is  reminiscent  of (the early) 
Schumpeter. We also allow for entrepreneurship in large corporations, but there 
rational, directed selection is more likely to reduce the randomness of innovation. 
With more specialists involved in joint design, and with more hierarchical levels 
of investment selection, more mistaken ideas are likely to be shifted out, but also 
unorthodox, brilliant successes. It is often only in hindsight that one can distin- 
guish  the  two.  In  small,  independent  firms  crazy  ideas  have  more  chance  of 
slipping through,  resulting in both more radical failures and more radical  suc- 
cesses. With some exaggeration one may argue that the evolutionary strength of 
small firms lies in what on the firm level may be seen as a weakness of reckless 
ventures and inability to survive mistakes. 
Conclusion 
From the perspective of dynamic efficiency, producer-user relations under condi- 
tions  of turbulence  can  have  a  significance far  beyond static  efficiency in  the 
supply of products to satisfy an existing demand with existing technology. Trading 
partners may be partners in the formation of concepts by "cross-firm learning"; in 
the creation of new combinations. One does not solely have a trading partner to 
satisfy present demands, but to create a potentiality for the satisfaction of future 
demands. Autonomy reduces dependence but also innovative potential. The de- 
velopment of novelty requires interaction. 
In the transition  from static to dynamic efficiency,  the weight of preference 
shifts to the decision to buy rather than to make. There are three reasons for this. 
The first is standard: in order to be expert and at the forefront of development one 
should concentrate on the activities at which one is best. The second derives from 
the work on producer-user cooperation by von Hippel (1989): in order to reduce 
development  times  of new products  and  to  reduce  risks  of maladjustment  to 
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launching a new product. A third and more fundamental reason obtains from the 
above exploration  of epistemology: one needs interaction  with  users, suppliers 
and competitors in order to acquire or develop appropriate or novel categories of 
perception, interpretation and evaluation. 
In the case of tacit knowledge, interaction facilitates the transfer of knowledge, 
in learning by doing or exchange of the carriers of the knowledge, that would not 
otherwise be possible. From the perspective of genetic epistemology, interaction 
facilitates accommodation to a new idea by contributing to the preceding stages 
of assimilation; in particular the stage of reciprocal assimilation.  From the per- 
spective of Heiner  (1983),  supplier-contractor  relations  yield a  solution  to  the 
problem of insufficient cognitive capacity to reliably cope with uncertainty,  by 
reducing the repertoire of actions and perceptions on the micro level of firms and 
generating requisite flexibility and scope on the higher level of weakly connected 
firms.  From the perspective of linguistic philosophy, interaction between trading 
partners facilitates invention as in language new meanings arise from conversa- 
tion: by interaction one benefits from the innovative force ("parole", entrepreneur- 
ship) of someone with a different, complementary background and outlook. As in 
language new meaning issues from communication; in transaction  relations the 
linkage  between firms  with  different  complementary  perspectives and  compe- 
tences requires a  basis for communication that  requires time to develop, on the 
basis of interaction. This takes time and represents an investment, whereby trans- 
action relations must last for some time to make the investment worth while. The 
investment is also transaction specific, on the part of both buyer and seller, which 
may contribute to the symmetry of dependence that reduces risks of opportunism, 
also on the part of the supplier, provided that he offers unique capabilities as a 
partner in development. This may lessen the need of the safeguards prescribed by 
standard TCE. 
Furthermore, as a transaction relation endures in time, perceptions and goals 
may shift to reduce perceived opportunism (but may also have the contrary effect). 
This also may lessen the need of safeguards against opportunism. Knowledge, but 
also preferences and norms associated with opportunism are inherently dynamic: 
one conducts transactions  from existing cognitive, affective or normative cate- 
gories, but the conduct of transactions also transforms and indeed generates those 
categories. Thus a generalized transaction cost theory can account for observed 
transactions in spite of high transaction specificity of assets and lack of the safe- 
guards  predicted  by TCE,  as  a  result  of mutual  dependence for learning  and 
innovation and/or lower perceived opportunism due to the growth of trust, as a 
function of succesful performance of the transaction relation. The theory does not 
always imply greater continuity of exchange relations. It also allows for sudden 
breakdowns of cooperation due to an escalation of mistrust or misunderstanding. 
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